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BOOK REVIEW

The Bakke Case: Race, Education, and Affirmative
Action. By Howard Ball. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press
of Kansas, 2000. Pp. 231. Hardcover. $29.95.
Reviewed by Harvey Gee*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan recently rang the latest death toll for affirmative
action in the context of higher education in the case of Grutter
v. Bollinger.' The Grutter case concerned the admissions
standards at the University of Michigan Law School, and
involved claims of reverse discrimination brought by a white
applicant. Significantly, U.S. District Judge Bernard A.
Friedman concluded in Grutter that the Supreme Court in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2 did not
recognize the achievement of racial diversity in university
admissions as a compelling state interest. On that basis,
Judge Friedman issued a lengthy opinion declaring that the
admissions policies at the University of Michigan's Law
School were unconstitutional. The Grutter decision and other
recent affirmative action rulings' have signaled the
* Staff Attorney, United States District Court for the District for Nevada,
Ninth Circuit; LL.M., The George Washington University Law School; J.D., St.
Mary's University School of Law; B.A., Sonoma State University.
1. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). See also Jeffrey Selingo,
Michigan Law School's Admissions Policies Found to be Unconstitutional,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 6, 2001, at A29 ("The ruling [in the Grutter
case] marked a sudden reversal in momentum for supporters of affirmative
action, after back-to-back decisions late last year upheld the use of race in
undergraduate admissions at the University of Washington and the University
of Michigan.").
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (declaring
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retrenchment of affirmative action in university admissions
and the gradual erosion of the Bakke decision.4 The drama of
the Bakke case is chronicled and analyzed by University of
Vermont Political Science Professor Howard Ball in his recent
work, The Bakke Case: Race, Education, and Affirmative
Action. Ball looks behind the judicial opinions drafted by the
Court, to reveal the political debate between the Justices
about this important case that has become the bedrock of the
contemporary affirmative action debate. The book is released
at a time when other branches of the federal government,
along with various states and private institutions, consider
whether to abolish affirmative action. As such, it is now
imperative to revisit the Bakke decision and the impact that
it has had on the present admissions controversy, and on the
adjoining political discourse. In his book, The Bakke Case,
societal discrimination and statistical disparities irrelevant and requiring an
identifiable, particularized showing of prior discrimination by a particular
industry to demonstrate a compelling interest for a race-sensitive public
contracting plan); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (setting the stage
for schools to contest their desegregation decrees and seek a declaration of
unitary status based on good faith compliance with the decree even if schools
are still segregated); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(declaring that congressional race-sensitive planes must be subjected to strict
scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995) (declaring that there is an equal protection violation where the shape
and demographics of a voting district in conjunction with indirect evidence
demonstrates that race was a predominant factor in the creation of the
district); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that (1) there is
no compelling interest in diversity in education; (2) the law school-not the state
of Texas-is the relevant government unity in measuring a constitutional
violation; and (3) a hostile university environment is not a present effect of past
discrimination).
4. See HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 198 (2000) ("It has been almost a quarter of a century
since Bakke came down in 1978. It is not hanging by a thread, but it has been
battered by lower federal court judges and by political opponents of preferential
affirmative action programs in American higher education.").
Other
commentators noted:
The succeeding generation has seen that noble dream devolve from one
heralding equal treatment regardless of race to one demanding
preferential treatment because of race. The pendulum, though, has
recently begun to swing back toward Dr. [Martin Luther] King's vision.
In courts of law and the court of public opinion, citizens are
increasingly voicing dissatisfaction with affirmative action as it is
currently employed, where people are favored due solely to race rather
than to actual disadvantage.
T. Vance McMahan & Don R. Willett, Hope from Hopwood: Chartinga Positive
Civil Rights Coursefor Texas and the Nation, 10 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 163, 163
(1999).
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Howard Ball remarks that "[i]t has been almost a quarter of a
century since Bakke came down in 1978. [Although it] is not
hanging by a thread, it has been battered by lower federal
court judges and by political opponents of preferential
affirmative action programs in American higher education."
With this in mind, observers expect the Supreme Court will
soon be compelled to accept a case such as Grutter for review
in its upcoming term.6 Recent affirmative action cases such
as Grutter illustrate the deep animosity toward Bakke even
today, twenty-three years after the decision.
The Supreme Court intended Bakke to be the definitive
ruling on the constitutionality of affirmative action programs
in the context of higher education.7 In 1977, Allan Bakke was
denied admission to the University of California, Davis
("UCD") Medical School and subsequently brought suit
against the University. In the process, he set off the
contemporary debate over affirmative action.! The Court, for
the first time, utilized the Equal Protection Clause in the

5. BALL, supra note 4, at 198.
6. See also Tony Mauro, Affirmative Action Cases may get High Court
Hearing, The Recorder, Oct. 23, 2001 at 3 (reporting that "advocates on both
sides of the racial preferences issue are looking to a pair of cases involving

affirmative action programs at the University of Michigan as the ones with the
most staying power and the highest likelihood of attracting Supreme Court
attention.").
7. See also ROBERT POST, INTRODUCTION: AFTER BAKKE, IN RACE AND
REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 13, 20 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin

eds., 1998) ("[Olver time Bakke has come to stand for the proposition that race
and ethnicity are constitutive of a structural and a temporal value of
diversity."); REVA B. SIEGEL, THE RACIAL RHETORICS OF COLORBLIND
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE CASE OF HOPWOOD V. TEXAS, IN RACE AND
REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 40 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin

eds., 1998) ("Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in University of California
v. Bakke, educational institutions have justified affirmative action programs by

emphasizing the goal of attaining a diverse student body.").
8. See also TERRY EASTAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR

COLORBLIND JUSTICE 76 (1996) ("The passage of years since Bakke has diluted
the force of the remedial rationale... the practice of affirmative action today

makes it difficult to accept the remedial rationale at face value."). But see
Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum, Promoting Equality by ProtectingLocal
Power: A Neo-Federalist Challenge to State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L.
& POLY REV. 129, 139-40 (1999) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court has gone to
considerable lengths to underscore that its decisions do not prohibit affirmative

action in all circumstances. To the contrary, the Court has consistently stated
that a program tailored to eliminate discrimination 'plainly serves compelling

state interests of the highest order."' (citing to Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 624 (1984)).
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context of affirmative action. The 154 page Bakke decision,
considered by many to be the most important civil rights
decision since the end of segregation, established that race
may be used as a factor in college admissions. Despite the
Bakke decision, there has been a gradual erosion of
affirmative action as a result of a series of challenges to the
use of such programs as a legitimate tool to end
discrimination in higher education.
According to Ball, one central issue in Bakke was
whether the case was about fairness or equal opportunity.9
Here, Ball does an admirable job in highlighting the idea that
this case was representative of affirmative action's inherent
conflict between numerical quality (the UCD position) and
moral equality (Bakke's position) and how this conflict divides
those in charge of interpreting the constitutionality of such a
conflict into starkly different opposing camps. Ball insists
that the Bakke case epitomized the societal clash between the
values of meritocracy and race neutrality and those of racial
balance and equality of opportunity." "It was the ideal notion
of equality versus the need to provide members of minority
groups with an educational boost so that they could enter
areas of employment formerly denied them."" In The Bakke
Case, Ball attempts to reconcile these competing interests.
The end result is a well-written authoritative discussion of
the issue of affirmative action and an excellent synopsis of the
most important and defining case on the subject.
Demonstrating his comprehensive scope of analysis, Ball
covers DeFunis v. Odegard," the affirmative action case that
preceded Bakke, the post-Bakke Supreme Court decisions,
and a brief forecast of the uncertain future of affirmative
action. Ball's volume is an enjoyable, informative, and
worthwhile read. The Bakke Case is valuable to anyone
9. See BALL, supra note 4, at xii.
The lawyers for the university knew that they were caught between a
rock (the Fourteenth Amendment's demand that a state provide all
persons with the equal protection of the laws) and the hard place (Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, which prohibited
discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, or gender, by
any public institution receiving federal financial aid).
Id.
10. See id. at 10-15.
11. Id. at 7.
12. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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interested in the affirmative action controversy, especially in
light of the fact that the federal government, various states
and private institutions are considering whether to abolish
affirmative action.
This book review summarizes the major sections of Ball's
book, which include: (1) DeFunis, the largely forgotten
affirmative action case that set the stage for the Bakke
litigation; (2) the UCD admissions program; (3) Allan Bakke's
crusade to gain admission to the medical school; (4) the
lawyers' roles in the litigation; (5) the Supreme Court oral
arguments; and (6) the divided decision itself.
II. DEFUNIS: THE PRELUDE CASE TO BAKKE
In DeFunis, Marcos DeFunis, a Jewish American, applied
for admission to the University of Washington School of Law,
but was denied admission on two separate occasions during a
time when the University had set aside sixteen percent of the
places in the entering classes exclusively for members of
racial minorities." All of these special admission applicants
were screened with standards that were lower than those for
the majority students. DeFunis believed that he had been
discriminated against in the admissions process because of
his race due to the fact that he otherwise met each
qualification that the University had in place. 4 Put simply,
DeFunis claimed that he had been deprived of his
constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws, and
challenged the affirmative action programs at the
University." When the case was heard in the lower courts,
DeFunis won and was admitted' to the law school. The school
appealed the decision and was able to have the decision
overturned, but that ruling was stayed. 6 This stay allowed
DeFunis to remain in school while he continued his appeal. 7
The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court
where Justices found the issue of affirmative action to be
moot because DeFunis was ready to graduate. 8 This inability
of the Court to reach the core constitutional issue in DeFunis
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See
See
See
See
See
See

BALL, supra note 4, at 23.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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demonstrated the reluctance of the Supreme Court to tackle
the affirmative action issue.19 In the final analysis of DeFunis,
the Supreme Court only managed to delay for a few more
years the inevitable clash over affirmative action.
III. THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS ADMISSIONS
PROGRAM

After a brief opening account of the state of racial affairs
in higher education during the mid-1970s post-DeFunis, Ball
proceeds to a legalistic description of the inter-workings of the
Bakke case. While the Supreme Court was quick to avoid the
affirmative action issue in the DeFunis case, it still did not
make a definitive statement in Bakke. Ball begins the book
by discussing the UCD admissions program.2 ° Importantly,
the author notes that most of the recent affirmative action
cases reiterate the same issues that were first introduced in
Bakke.2
The Bakke case involved a "special admissions"
program developed by the medical school at UCD. This
program involved a number of slots that were "set aside" for
minority applicants, who were evaluated on a separate set of
criteria in comparison to that of non-minority applicants. The
goal of the medical school was simple: increase the number of
minority doctors.2 2
For four years, the UCD Medical School had no
preferential affirmative action admissions program.2 3 During
that time, only three percent of its applicants were minority.24
The administration was concerned about the lack of diversity
at the University and established a special preferential
admissions program in 1970.25 Ball cites to the University of
California Board of Regents' lawyer Donald Reidhaar's brief,
and explains that the objectives of the admissions program
were to "enhance diversity in the student body and the
profession, eliminate historic barriers to medical careers for
19. See BALL, supra note 4, at 23.
20. See id. at 41-59.
21. See id. at 186-92.
22. See id. at 49 ("The general objectives of the program...were to enhance
diversity in the student body and the profession, eliminate historic barriers for
medical careers for disadvantaged racial and ethnic minority groups, and
increase aspiration for such careers on the part of members of those groups.").
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See BALL, supra note 4, at 49.
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disadvantaged racial and ethnic minority groups, and
increase aspiration for such careers on the part of members of
those groups."26
Under the regular selection process, if an applicant's
grade point average ("GPA") was less than 2.5, there was
summary rejection.27 Of those applicants who had better than
a 2.5 GPA, forty percent were invited to the campus for
They
interviews with admissions committee members.
observed the applicant's personality, motivation, and other
non-statistical characteristics. 28 Afterward, the interviewers
reviewed the entire file and graded the applicant, using a
2
All
scale of 1-100, with 100 being the highest possible scoreY.
the interviewers gave scores in the following categories: (1)
the interview, (2) the overall GPA, (3) the scores received on
the Medical College Admission Test ("MCAT"), (4) letters of
recommendation, and (5) extracurricular experiences. 30 Four
other committee members then followed the same process."
The scores for each of the five categories were tallied and
averaged, producing the "benchmark score."32 In 1973, the
maximum score possible was 500, and in 1974, it was 600." In
order to be considered for admission through the special
and/or
program, an applicant had to be an
4 "economically
educationally disadvantaged person."0
In determining whether the applicant met this criterion,
the special admissions committee considered such factors as
the applicant's general social and economic background. But
if the candidate was not deemed disadvantaged, the file was
sent to the regular admissions committee for their review and
judgment. 5
26. Id.
27. See id. at 50.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See BALL, supra note 4, at 50.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 50-51.
35. See id. at 51. The committee considered whether the application fee was
waived;
whether the applicant worked their way through college; whether the applicant
interrupted their studies and took a leave of absence because of economic
disadvantage; whether the applicant participated in an equal educational
opportunity program as an undergraduate; and what occupations were held by
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After being denied admission to the UCD Medical School
in 1973, the year before, Bakke re-applied.36
In the
meantime, UCD had adopted a new general application
form.3 7 The applicant was asked whether they wished to be
considered
an
"economically
and/or
educationally
disadvantaged" person in one of four enumerated minority
groups: "Black, Chicano, Asian, and American Indians." 38
The UCD Medical School again rejected Bakke, whereupon he
sought legal counsel to continue his efforts to gain admission
to the school.39 According to Ball, the major issues in Bakke
were whether the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause or
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited a public
university from using set-asides or quotas to admit minority
applicants. °

IV. ALLAN BAKKE'S LEGAL CRUSADE
The next section of the book traces the factual events
that led to the eventual lawsuit filed by Allan Bakke. Bakke
developed an interest in medicine while he was serving as an
officer in the U.S. Marine Corps during a combat tour in
Vietnam.4 ' While attending night courses at San Jose State
University and Stanford University, he enrolled in all the
undergraduate chemistry and biology courses required for
admission to medical school. 42 He also gained the requisite
practical experience by volunteering for emergency room
work at El Camino Hospital in Mountain View, California. 3
Ball suggests that Bakke's age was a hindrance for him in the
medical school admissions process. 4 Several medical schools,

the applicant's parents. Id.
36. See id.
37. See BALL, supra note 4, at 51.
38. Id. Asian Americans were not included in the preferential program.
Notably, a decade later, the number of Asian Americans in higher education
would cause them to be excluded from many affirmative action programs due to
their "overrepresentation." Under these admissions schemes, Asian Americans
are grouped together with whites, and not considered minorities. See Harvey
Gee, Why did Asian Americans Vote Against the 1996 California Civil Rights
Initiative?,2 LOYOLA J. OF PUB. INT. L. 1, 6-8 (2001).
39. See id. at 47.
40. See id. at 48.
41. See id. at 46.
42. See id.
43. See BALL, supra note 4, at 46-47.
44. See id. at 47.
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including UCD informed him that his age was a significant
factor in his rejection. In fact, Ball states that Bakke was
told by the UCD admissions committee that "when an
applicant is over thirty, his age is a serious factor which must
be considered.... The Committee believes that an older
applicant must be unusually highly qualified if he is to be
seriously considered."" In 1973 all eleven medical schools
Bakke applied to rejected him, and Bakke's age was given as
the major factor in their decisions not to admit him.46
When Bakke initially applied to UCD his benchmark
score was 468 out of a possible 500 points.4 7 However, he had
applied late because of his mother-in-law's serious illness.48
UCD used a rolling admissions process, and had already sent
admission letters to 123 applicants. A score of 470 was used
as the minimum benchmark score for admission at that late
date.4 9 On May 14, 1973, Bakke received his first rejection
letter from UCD. °
When Bakke re-applied in August 1973, there were over
3,100 non-minority applicants for eighty-four available
His total score after the admissions committee
seats."
reviewed his file was 549 out of a possible 600 points. 2 In
late September 1973, UCD informed Bakke that he had not
been admitted under the early-admission process and that he
would not be placed on the alternate wait-list.53 Interestingly,
thirty-two non-minority applicants with scores higher than
Bakke's were also not admitted to the UCD Medical School,
and of these applicants, twelve did not make the alternates
list.5 4 On April Fool's Day 1974, Bakke was informed that the
UCD Medical School rejected him.55
Allan Bakke filed suit against UCD alleging that he was
the victim of "reverse discrimination" as a result of the UCD
affirmative action admissions policy. He argued that out of

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 54.
id.
id.
BALL, supra note 4, at 55.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 56.
id.
BALL, supra note 4, at 56.
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the one hundred seats annually filled by first-year medical
students, the University of California at Davis Medical School
had set aside sixteen solely for minority applicants.56 Bakke
claimed that the school's admission scheme violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.57 Bakke contended that
he was rejected not because of his qualifications, but because
of his race.5" Specifically, he asserted that he was not
admitted into the medical program despite the fact that his
grade point average and MCAT scores were higher than those
of certain minority persons who had been awarded one of the
sixteen minority set-aside slots. 9
Ball goes on to discuss the political climate in which
Bakke brought his litigation." In the 1970s, there was an
exponential growth in the number of students interested in
attending medical school.6
America's medical schools
however, did not have the capacity to provide all qualified
applicants with a medical education."2 Coinciding with this
extraordinary increase in applications for admission, most
medical schools established a variety of preferential
admission policies in order to increase the number of
qualified minority students attending their predominately
white medical schools.63 Ball suggests that this led to more
non-minority applicants being rejected in favor of admitting
minority applicants. 4 Certainly the time was ripe for Bakke
to bring his lawsuit.
V. THE LAWYERS

A particular strength of The Bakke Case is its insightful
analysis of the early stages of the case and its discussion of
the lawyers involved in the litigation. Demonstrating his
comprehensive analytical style, Ball offers an in-depth
background of the parties in Bakke. Bakke retained wellrenowned San Francisco lawyer Reynold Colvin to represent
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978).
id. at 277-78.
id. at 278.
id. at 277.
BALL, supra note 4, at 49.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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Colvin was an active member of San Francisco's

Jewish community, and served as the president of the city's
chapter of the American Jewish Committee.66 Colvin argued
that setting aside sixteen seats for minority applicants was
an illegal, unconstitutional racial quota, prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.67 At the same time, he
downplayed the enormous disparities between regular and
special admittees as well as Bakke's qualifications, which
were categorically better than most of the admittees, whether
minority or non-minority.6 The prevailing theme was that
racial quotas, regardless of their name or whether they were
69
benign or remedial, were nonetheless illegal.
On the other side, representing the University of
California ("UC"), was university general counsel Donald
°
Reidhaar and his three-person legal defense team. Reidhaar
argued that there was nothing illegal or unconstitutional
about UCD's creation of a preferential admissions program
for minorities.7 According to his view, when race is used as a
positive factor to overcome the vestiges of slavery and race
72
discrimination, the racial preferences are constitutional. He
that the UCD admissions' "goal" was not a
maintained
"quota." 3 Reidhaar insisted that if there were fewer qualified
"special" candidates in a given year, then the unfilled seats
The
would revert to qualified regular applicants."
University's arguments, however, were weak. A stronger
argument would have pointed out that the program was
necessary because the public educational system has failed to
produce African American professionals. Instead, Reidhaar
merely accepted Bakke's assertion that he was better
qualified than African American students enrolled at the
medical school.7" He also relied on the even weaker argument

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 53.
See BALL, supra note 4, at 53.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 53-54.
See id. at 54.
See BALL, supra note 4, at 54.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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that Bakke had no "standing to sue" in court because he had
fallen short of the minimum scores necessary for admission to
the medical school, even though his scores were admittedly
higher than those of minority admittees. 6
After discussing the litigation at the state trial court
level and at the California Supreme Court, Ball proceeds to
devote the remainder of his book to a discussion of the Bakke
case before the United States Supreme Court and how the
Justices of the Supreme Court interpreted the substantive
issues. By February 1977, Allan Bakke was almost thirtyeight years old. His last hope for admission into UCD's
Medical School, and for the resolution of the moral, political,
and legal issue of racial quotas, now rested with the Supreme
Court.77 With the grant of certiorari, the Court announced
that it would hear the case in the 1977-1978 term and decide
whether preferential admissions processes based on race and
ethnicity were unconstitutional. 8
VI. SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS

Oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court took
place as scheduled on October 12, 1977.78 Because of the
importance of the Bakke case, hundreds of would-be
spectators lined up in the Court's plaza, some as early as 4
a.m., hoping to gain entrance to the oral arguments.0 Many
who heard the arguments were members of minority groups,"1
but Allan Bakke himself was not present. 82

Anti-Bakke

picketers appeared, in the Court's plaza, chanting: "Defend.
Extend Affirmative Action!"" The press treated the Bakke
4
oral arguments as a major event in American politics.

Meanwhile, inside the Supreme Court, the Justices
participated in the two-hour Bakke oral arguments." Using
those documents as their primary data, Ball simplifies and
provides great understanding to such a complex case.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 68.
78. See BALL, supra note 4, at 68.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 88.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

84. See BALL, supra note 4, at 88.

85. See id. at 89.
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Furthermore, he extensively covers the amicus curiae briefs,
providing relative understanding and communicating the vast
importance that these briefs had in the case.
Colvin's brief for the respondent Bakke urged the Court
86
to let the California Supreme Court's decision stand. Colvin
argued that the Court should deny certiorari because
(1) the plaintiffs petition "distorted the holding of the
California Supreme Court," (2) the "alleged conflict
between the California Supreme Court and other state
Supreme Courts is not a true conflict meriting resolution
by this Court," and (3) the California Supreme Court
correctly decided Bakke "and did so by way of a reasoned
87
application of this Court's prior constitutional decisions."
Reidhaar and the University of California Regents asked
U.S. Solicitor General Archibald Cox to help them prepare
and argue the case before the Supreme Court. Cox had prior
experience arguing before the Court, and had taught at a
8
Cox
university that had a similar admissions procedure.
argued in his brief that a "race-conscious plan for minority
admissions" is the only affirmative action program that
actually works to enable "qualified applicants from
disadvantaged minorities to attend medical schools, law
schools, and other institutions of higher learning in sufficient
numbers to enhance the quality of the education for all
8
students.""
°
Cox never mentioned Allen Bakke, in contrast to Colvin."
According to Ball, Colvin's inexperience showed, because he
9
spent nearly half his time repeating the facts in the case. "
Colvin began by claiming that Allan Bakke was the victim of
an illegal quota that violated the U.S. Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause, the "privileges and immunities" clause of
the California Constitution, and Title VI of the 1964 Civil
86. See id. at 64. Colvin's position was that "the primary issue in this case
is Allan Bakke's right to be admitted to the medical school... as well as the
constitutionality of the petitioner's procedure for selecting students to attend
the medical school." Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 92.
89. Id. at 69.
90. "Colvin's "at times impassioned" presentation, according to the
Washington Post reporter covering the story, focused solely on Allan Bakke's
rights, rights that were violated by the UCD medical school's affirmative action
program." BALL, supra note 4, at 96.
91. See BALL, supra note 4, at 96.
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Rights Act.9"
He explained that the program was
unconstitutional because it was based on a racial quota,
"where sixteen of the one hundred vacancies were
filled with
minority applicants with lower overall ratings than some
majority applicants who were rejected."9 3 After the conclusion
of the oral arguments, the Justices deliberated at length
before drafting their respective decisions.94
In The Bakke Case, Ball uses published and unpublished
sources, including interviews with the Supreme Court
Justices, to reveal the deep divisions within the Court, in an
effort to enable the reader to draw their own conclusions
about how and why the Justices decided the case as they
did."
The highly divided Court in Bakke expressed a
begrudging acceptance of race-based affirmative action.96 Ball
explains that the Bakke opinion was actually six separate
opinions, and in the end, there was no single Court
pronouncement that had the full support of five or more of the
nine Justices.9 7 Instead, according to Ball, there was a
bifurcated judgment of the Court as announced by Justice
Powell, with each of the "gangs" of four concurring and
dissenting in different segments of the Powell "judgment.""
VII. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In Bakke, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
unconstitutionality of the "special admissions" program, but
reversed the lower court's prohibition of using race
consideration as an admission criteria.99 The Court applied
the traditional equal protection test, i.e. strict scrutiny,
whereby racial classifications may be used only when the
classifications serve a compelling governmental interest and
is narrowly tailored to further that interest. 0 0 Yet, in this
section, Ball points out the Court's unwillingness to make
policy and its preference only to interpret the legality of such
controversial issues.
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Four Justices, led by Justices Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall, voted to approve affirmative action programs as
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for this
constitutional.'
group, concurring with Justice Powell to sustain affirmative
action in principle, and declaring that public graduate schools
can take race into consideration to achieve diversity among
Ball reveals that these four Justices
the student body.'
concluded that the UCD plan was valid in every respect,
whether from the Title VI perspective or from the perspective
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.'
For Brennan and the others, "under any standard of
Fourteenth Amendment review other than one requiring
absolute color-blindness, the Davis program clearly passes
muster.... [It] used race in furtherance of educational and
04
social objectives that are proper and even compelling."
Marshall echoed Brennan's sentiments in writing that:
[a]s to this country being a melting pot-either the Negro
did not get into the pot or he did not get melted down.. .If
only the principle of color-blindness had been accepted by
the majority in Plessy in 1896, we would not be faced with
this problem in 1978.... For us to now say that the
principle of color-blindness prevents the University from
giving 'special' consideration to race when this Court, in
1896, licensed the states to continue to consider race, is to
make a mockery of the principle of 'equal justice under
law."0 5
Marshall concluded by saying,
We are stuck with this case. We must decide it. We are not
yet all equals, in large part because of the refusal of the
[Court in Plessy v. Ferguson] to adopt the principle of
color-blindness. It would be the cruelest irony for this
Court to adopt the dissent in Plessy now and hold that the
06
University must use color-blind admissions.
Marshall insisted on using his more flexible standard,
one that he had discussed and used on a number of occasions
before Bakke. °7 It took into account the importance of the
101.
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governmental purpose as well as the severity of the
discrimination. °8 He also argued, as he did in all "equality"
cases, that the Court could not deal with the issue of
affirmative action in the purely rational legalistic fashion,
appropriate for an ideal world. °9 For Marshall, the "legality
of affirmative action simply could not be resolved without
consideration of the historical, legal, and sociological context
of past racial policies and practices.""0
In Ball's view, the Brennan opinion"' joined by White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, was a milestone opinion of sorts."'
For the very first time, these four Justices adopted a
transformational
interpretation
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment." 3 Brennan's opinion reflected his groups' views
on the manner of affirmative action, and it received Powell's
tempered approval "on the issue of treating the race of a
4
candidate affirmatively."11
The Brennan opinion noted that four Justices supported
the view that the judgment of the California Supreme Court
should be reversed in all aspects, not only insofar as it
prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious
programs in the future, but also insofar as the judgment
orders that respondent Bakke be admitted to the Davis
Medical School. 1 5
Another four Justices voted with Justice Powell to strike
down the affirmative action plan as unconstitutional." 6
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of this quartet of Burger,
Rehnquist, Stewart, and himself. 7 Justice Stevens argued
that the UCD plan was invalid in every respect, and
concluded that Bakke was excluded from UCD in violation of
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." 8 Unlike the Brennan
group, the Stevens' group rejected any use of race as a factor
in admission procedures at colleges and universities."9
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Stevens stated that "it is perfectly clear that the question of
whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions
decision is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of
that issue is inappropriate."' 2 ° Justice Stevens was of the
view that as a matter of judicial parsimony and self-restraint,
the case could be resolved through statutory interpretation
alone.' 2 '
In Justice Powell's opinion, the UCD special admissions
program unconstitutionally denied Bakke equal treatment in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore the California Supreme Court's
22
order admitting Bakke to the medical school was valid.' He
noted, however, that the use of quotas or set-asides can be
justified in situations where there was actual proof that an
institution receiving federal funds had indeed discriminated
or color.1 23
against applicants on the basis of race
Nonetheless, Powell thought that it was unnecessary to
explore that matter in Bakke, since UCD had no record of
Title VI of
intentional discrimination against minorities."
was not
Powell,
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, according to
controlling in this case, because it goes no further in
prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection
Clause.'
Justice Powell believed that race could be used as a factor
in the admissions process, but that the UCD process was an
unconstitutional racial quota.'26 Therefore, the California
Supreme Court should be affirmed as to the UC's reliance on
unconstitutional quotas and reversed as to the use of race as
a "plus" in the admissions process.'27 Brennan, White, and
Marshall agreed with Powell's contention, although not with
his proposal to utilize the strict scrutiny standard to decide
the matter.2 ' Brennan believed that strict scrutiny should
only be used in cases where race was used to stigmatize and
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demean." 9 Brennan thought that in this case, where race was
used for remedial purposes, the standard should not be strict
scrutiny but rather "scrutiny more exacting than minimal
rationality."' 0 Thus, the divided decision in Bakke became
the central source of the affirmative action debate, which
would be closely examined by law students, lawyers, judges,
and constitutional scholars for generations to come.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Many scholars have referred to The Bakke Case in their
discussion of the case or its relationship to the affirmative
action debate. Yet, few writers bother to re-examine the
particular facts of the actual litigation in the case. Howard
Ball represents the rare type. In The Bakke Case, Ball
succeeds in this ambitious task. Unlike other tracts that
discuss Bakke and its holding in the abstraction and its
theoretical level of analysis, Ball seeks not only to address the
issues of the case, but also to discuss the litigants, their
advocates, and the justices involved in the decisions from the
lower courts to the U.S. Supreme Court. It is a worthwhile
endeavor, well executed. Whatever views one may hold on
affirmative action, the volume is an intriguing narrative
intertwined with subtle legal interpretations which should
serve as a tremendous resource for those seeking a more
complete understanding of the case, and its ramifications. It
is highly recommended for any reader who cares about the
origins of the modern debate and the future of affirmative
action in higher education, and curious about the facts and
issues that brought about Justice Powell's compromise
decision and the personal story of Allan Bakke.
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